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#### The struggle over the question of who counts as human is THE question of the debate—the system of colonialism instituted by European powers in the 15th and 16th centuries haunts the present in the form of coloniality—an epistemological structure that privileges the Western subject as the only legitimate expression of human knowledge. The question of Latin American engagement can only be answered when we first unsettle the coloniality of knowledge and being that has demarcated the majority of the world as subhuman populations given over to death.

Wynter 03 (Sylvia, Professor of Romance Languages at Stanford University, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom

Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, 3.3 (2003) 257-337, MUSE)

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT THE STRUGGLE OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/ Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano 1999, 2000), 2 and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo 1999, 2000). 3 The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (20 percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of [End Page 260] earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South 4 )—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman 1987). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon 1963)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, 1999), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (1992) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, [End Page 261] "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" [Bateson 1969] as if it were that of the human itself), then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich 1986]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties." The further proposal here is that, although the brief hiatus during which the sixties' large-scale challenge based on multiple issues, multiple local terrains of struggles (local struggles against, to use Mignolo's felicitous phrase, a "global design" [Mignolo 2000]) erupted was soon to be erased, several of the issues raised then would continue to be articulated, some in sanitized forms (those pertaining to the category defined by Bauman as "the seduced"), others in more harshly intensified forms (those pertaining to Bauman's category of the "repressed" [Bauman 1987]). Both forms of "sanitization" would, however, function in the same manner as the lawlike effects of the post-sixties' vigorous discursive and institutional re-elaboration of the central overrepresentation, which enables the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical human world to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of the now globally hegemonic ethnoclass world of "Man." This, in the same way as in an earlier epoch and before what Howard Winant identifies as the "immense historical rupture" of the "Big Bang" processes that were to lead to a contemporary modernity defined by the "rise of the West" and the "subjugation of the rest of us" (Winant 1994)—before, therefore, the secularizing intellectual revolution of Renaissance humanism, followed by the decentralizing religious heresy of the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the modern state—the then world of laymen and laywomen, including the institution of the political state, as well as those of commerce and of economic production, had remained subordinated to that of the post-Gregorian Reform Church of Latin-Christian Europe (Le Goff 1983), and therefore to the "rules of the social order" and the theories "which gave them sanction" (See Konrad and Szelenyi guide-quote), as these rules were articulated by its theologians and implemented by its celibate clergy (See Le Goff guide-quote). [End Page 262] The Janus face of the emergence of Mignolo's proposed "modernity/coloniality" complementarity is sited here. As also is the answer to the why of the fact that, as Aníbal Quijano insists in his Qué tal Raza! (2000), the "idea of race" would come to be "the most efficient instrument of social domination invented in the last 500 years." In order for the world of the laity, including that of the then ascendant modern European state, to escape their subordination to the world of the Church, it had been enabled to do so only on the basis of what Michel Foucault identifies as the "invention of Man": that is, by the Renaissance humanists' epochal redescription of the human outside the terms of the then theocentric, "sinful by nature" conception/ "descriptive statement" of the human, on whose basis the hegemony of the Church/clergy over the lay world of Latin-Christian Europe had been supernaturally legitimated (Chorover 1979). While, if this redescription was effected by the lay world's invention of Man as the political subject of the state, in the transumed and reoccupied place of its earlier matrix identity Christian, the performative enactment of this new "descriptive statement" and its master code of symbolic life and death, as the first secular or "degodded" (if, at the time, still only partly so) mode of being human in the history of the species, was to be effected only on the basis of what Quijano identifies as the "coloniality of power," Mignolo as the "colonial difference," and Winant as a huge project demarcating human differences thinkable as a "racial longue durée." One of the major empirical effects of which would be "the rise of Europe" and its construction of the "world civilization" on the one hand, and, on the other, African enslavement, Latin American conquest, and Asian subjugation.

#### The affirmative’s economic engagement with Latin America is just one more manifestation of 500 years of coloniality—the promise of prosperity, democracy, and security is a toxic fantasy that obscures the trail of dead reaching back through time.

Mignolo 05, (Walter, Duke University, “THE IDEA OF LATIN AMERICA”, 2005, 6/28/13|Ashwin)

The logic of coloniality can be understood as working through four wide domains of human experience: (1) the economic: appropriation of land, exploitation of labor, and control of finance; (2) ¶ the political: control of authority; (3) the civic: control of gender and sexuality; (4) the epistemic and the subjective/personal: control ¶ of knowledge and subjectivity. The logic of coloniality has been in ¶ place from the conquest and colonization of Mexico and Peru until ¶ and beyond the war in Iraq, despite superficial changes in the scale ¶ and agents of exploitation/control in the past five hundred years of ¶ history. Each domain is interwoven with the others, since appropriation of land or exploitation of labor also involves the control of ¶ finance, of authority, of gender, and of knowledge and subjectivity.8¶ The operation of the colonial matrix is invisible to distracted eyes, ¶ and even when it surfaces, it is explained through the rhetoric of ¶ modernity that the situation can be “corrected” with “development,” “democracy,” a “strong economy,” etc. What some will see as “lies” ¶ from the US presidential administration are not so much lies as part ¶ of a very well-codified “rhetoric of modernity,” promising salvation ¶ for everybody in order to divert attention from the increasingly ¶ oppressive consequences of the logic of coloniality. To implement ¶ the logic of coloniality requires the celebratory rhetoric of modernity, as the case of Iraq has illustrated from day one. As capital and ¶ power concentrate in fewer and fewer hands and poverty increases ¶ all over the word, the logic of coloniality becomes ever more ¶ oppressive and merciless. Since the sixteenth century, the rhetoric ¶ of modernity has relied on the vocabulary of salvation, which was ¶ accompanied by the massive appropriation of land in the New ¶ World and the massive exploitation of Indian and African slave labor, ¶ justified by a belief in the dispensability of human life – the lives ¶ of the slaves. Thus, while some Christians today, for example, beat ¶ the drum of “pro-life values,” they reproduce a rhetoric that diverts ¶ attention from the increasing “devaluation of human life” that the ¶ thousands dead in Iraq demonstrate. Thus, it is not modernity that will ¶ overcome coloniality, because it is precisely modernity that needs and produces ¶ coloniality.¶ As an illustration, let us follow the genealogy of just the first of ¶ the four domains and see how the logic of coloniality has evolved ¶ in the area of land, labor, and finance. Below I will complement the brief sketch of this first quadrant by going deeper into the fourth ¶ one (knowledge and subjectivity) to show how knowledge transformed Anáhuac and Tawantinsuyu into America and then into ¶ Latin America and, in the process, how new national and subcontinental identities were created. But, first, think of the massive ¶ appropriation of land by the Spanish and Portuguese, the would-be ¶ landlords of the Americas during the sixteenth century, and the same ¶ by the British, French, and Dutch in the extended Caribbean (from ¶ Salvador de Bahia in Brazil to Charleston in today’s South Carolina, ¶ and including the north of Colombia and Venezuela in addition to ¶ the Caribbean islands). The appropriation of land went hand in hand ¶ with the exploitation of labor (Indians and African slaves) and the ¶ control of finance (the accumulation of capital as a consequence of ¶ the appropriation of land and the exploitation of labor). Capital ¶ concentrated in Europe, in the imperial states, and not in the colonies. You can follow this pattern through the nineteenth century ¶ when England and France displaced Spain and Portugal as leading ¶ imperial countries. The logic of coloniality was then reproduced, ¶ and, of course, modified, in the next step of imperial expansion into ¶ Africa and Asia.¶ You can still see the same projects today in the appropriation of ¶ areas of “natural resources” (e.g., in the Amazon or oil-rich Iraq). ¶ Land cannot be reproduced. You can reproduce seeds and other ¶ “products” of land; but land itself is limited, which is another reason ¶ why the appropriation of land is one of the prime targets of capital ¶ accumulation today. The “idea” of Latin America is that of a large ¶ mass of land with a wealth of natural resources and plenty of cheap ¶ labor. That, of course, is the disguised idea. What the rhetoric of ¶ modernity touted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Washington ¶ consensus would say is that “Latin” America is just waiting for its ¶ turn to “develop.” You could also follow the exploitation of labor ¶ from the Americas to the Industrial Revolution to the movement ¶ of factories from the US to developing nations in order to reduce ¶ costs. As for financial control, just compare the number and size of ¶ banks, for example, in New York, London, or Frankfurt, on the one ¶ hand, versus the ones in Bolivia, Morocco, or India, on the other.¶ Thus, if we consider “America” from the perspective of coloniality (not modernity) and let the Indigenous perspective take center stage, another history becomes apparent. The beginning of the ¶ Zapatista “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” gives us a ¶ blueprint:¶ We are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery, ¶ then during the War of Independence against Spain; then to ¶ avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to ¶ promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from ¶ our soil; later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the ¶ just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled ¶ and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like ¶ us. We have been denied by our rulers the most elemental ¶ conditions of life, so they can use us as cannon fodder and ¶ pillage the wealth of our country. They don’t care that we have ¶ nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over hour heads, ¶ no land, no work, no health care, no food or education. Nor ¶ are we able to freely and democratically elect our political ¶ representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor ¶ is there peace or justice for ourselves and our children.9¶ The “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” precedes a long history ¶ rewritten from an Indigenous perspective (as opposed to the perspective of Mexican Creoles and Mestizos/as or French or US ¶ “experts” on Mexican and “Latin” American history). You may ¶ wonder whether the Indigenous people had a perspective because ¶ you imagine that history is history and what happened just happened, ¶ and argue that there are of course “different interpretations” but ¶ not “different perspectives.” Different interpretations presuppose a ¶ common and shared principle of knowledge and of the rules of the ¶ game, while different perspectives presuppose that the principles of ¶ knowledges and the rules of the game are geo-historically located ¶ in the structure of power of the modern colonial world. To show ¶ how this works, we need something such as “dependency theory” ¶ for the epistemological domain.10 “Dependency theory” showed the ¶ differential of power in the economic domain insofar as it described ¶ a certain structure of differential power in the domain of the ¶ economy. But it also proved the epistemic differential and the distribution of labor within an imperial geo-politics of knowledge in ¶ which political economy moved in one direction: from First to ¶ Third World countries and to contain Second World communism. ¶ In this sense, dependency theory is relevant in changing the geopolitics of knowledge and in pointing toward the need for, and the ¶ possibility of, different locations of understanding and of knowledge ¶ production.¶ The first part of the “Manifesto from the Lacandon Jungle” is a ¶ history and a description of the current economic and social situation in Chiapas, subdivided into the “First Wind” and the “Second ¶ Wind” in emulation of sixteenth-century Spanish chronicles of the ¶ New World. Cast in terms familiar to those conversant with globalization, the first wind is the wind from above and the second that ¶ from below. The declaration, then, outlines the direction of a project ¶ to rewrite the colonial history of modernity from the perspective ¶ of coloniality (instead of writing the history of coloniality from the ¶ perspective of modernity). This framing is subject to questions and ¶ criticisms by critical and inquisitive readers. Professional historians ¶ could argue that there is little historical rigor in this “pamphlet” ¶ and that what we need is serious and rigorous histories of how ¶ things “really” happened. Again, that argument assumes that the ¶ events carry in themselves their own truth and the job of the historian is to discover them. The problem is that “rigorous historiography” is more often than not complicitous with modernity (since ¶ the current conceptualization and practice of historiography, as a ¶ discipline, are a modern rearticulation of a practice dating back to ¶ – again – Greek philosophy). In that respect, the argument for disciplinary rigor turns out to be a maneuver that perpetuates the myth ¶ of modernity as something separate from coloniality. Therefore, if ¶ you happened to be a person educated in the Calmemac in Anáhuac ¶ and were quite far away from the legacies of the Greeks, it would ¶ be your fault for not being aware what civilized history is and how ¶ important it is for you.¶ Other criticisms may stem from the fact that the division of above ¶ and below still originates in the concept of the “above.” Indeed, it ¶ was the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas who first described ¶ (but did not enact himself ) the perspective now being enacted by ¶ the Zapatistas. The most suspicious reader would add that it is SubComandante Marcos (a Mexican Mestizo who studied at the Universidad Autónoma de México) who narrates. Legitimate ¶ and interesting objections, these. However, such objections remain ¶ entangled in the web and the perspective of modernity; that is, in ¶ the expectations created by the hegemonic perspective of modernity ¶ itself. To unfold this last statement, let’s take another step and perhaps ¶ a detour and come back to the inception of the logic of coloniality ¶ implied in the very idea of both “America” and “Latin” America..4ever

#### The affirmative’s naïve embargo politics proves the productive nature of power – lifting the repressive embargo will not free the Cuban people but will simply provide them with new corporate masters.

Mark 96 Mark, Detroit, Oct. 1, 1996, The imperialist Helms-Burton law and the myth of Cuban socialism, [http://www.communistvoice.org/10cHelms.html]

With Clinton and Congress trying to placate the right-wing on Cuba, another section of bourgeois opinion is critical of this policy and wants an easing of the embargo**.** They do not want the embargo lifted because they are interested in alleviating the suffering of the Cuban masses**.** Rather, they believe that U**.**S**.** imperialism can best push its agenda in Cuba if there is an opening**.** They object to the right-wing bullying on the grounds of expediency**.** They point out that 30-plus years of embargo have not brought down Castro and allow Castro to cement his power by playing on the sentiments of the Cuban masses against arrogant U**.**S**.** threats**.** As well the bourgeois embargo opponents note that there is no viable organized force in Cuba that could presently challenge Castro**.** Thus, they hold that U**.**S**.** interests in Cuba are best served by having U**.**S**.** corporations inside the country, even while Castro is still around**.** They know that U**.**S**.** corporations entering Cuba will be a source of U**.**S**.** political influence there**.** . The bottom line for the bourgeois opponents of the hard-line policy is, well, the bottom line**.** They see the corporations of other countries setting up shop in Cuba and reaching trade deals**.** They worry that the U**.**S**.** companies will be frozen out**.** This view is expressed, for instance, by Wayne S**.** Smith, a prominent bourgeois commentator on Cuba who was U**.**S**.** ambassador there from 1958-61**.** In an article in *Foreign Affairs* of March/April 1996, Smith concludes that the Cuba embargo "complicates relations with America's most important trading partners while denying U**.**S**.** companies any share of the Cuban market**.** The latter is not large, but a recent trade study estimated that the United States and Cuba could quickly be doing some $7 billion a year in business**.**" [(1)](http://www.communistvoice.org/10cHelms.html#N_1_) In another article in the same publication, Pamela S**.** Falk, Staff Director of the U**.**S**.** House of Representatives Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, notes that corporate giants such as GM, Bank of Boston, Sears and major hotel chains have been on scouting expeditions to Cuba**.** AT&T wants to participate in the multi-billion dollar privatization of the Cuban telecommunications system**.** The article quotes the CEO of the Ingersoll-Rand construction corporation stating "The embargo is a waste of taxpayer dollars and time" while his counterpart at Archer Daniels Midland claims not to "know a corporate CEO who thinks excluding U**.**S**.** business is a good idea, particularly when all of Western Europe is down there**.**" [(2)](http://www.communistvoice.org/10cHelms.html#N_2_) . While it is undoubtedly true that many capitalists do not like the present policy on Cuba, it does not automatically follow that the embargo will quickly fall**.** For one thing, the embargo has long had widespread appeal among the U**.**S**.** bourgeoisie overall, which does not trust the Castro government to look after their interests no matter how many concessions it gives to foreign investors**.** For another, there is a question of whether the corporate interest in investing in Cuba is strong enough for them to force the capitalist politicians like Clinton and Dole to forgo political expediency and look "weak on communism"**.** (After all, the bourgeoisie spent decades building up anti-communist hysteria against Cuba**.**) In the case of the huge potential of the China market, the U**.**S**.** bourgeoisie did not allow their usual hysteria against the so-called "communism" there to stop economic relations**.** But the Cuban market does not have anywhere near the same importance to overall U**.**S**.** imperialist interests as does the China market**.** . Of course, the embargo against Cuba is not just opposed by corporations who want to conquer the Cuban market, but by progressive activists who oppose various hardships imposed on the Cuban masses by the embargo and the efforts of the U**.**S**.** to strangle Cuba**.** But it would be a big mistake for activists to think that the lifting of the embargo will solve the main problems of the Cuban masses. This requires not only opposition to U**.**S**.** bullying but opposing the Castro regime and the state-capitalist order in Cuba**.** Indeed, an end to the U.S. embargo means the beginning of the U.S. multinationals sharing in the plunder of the Cuban toilers**.** The anti-embargo section of the U.S**.** of the U**.**S**.** bourgeoisie opposes the pro-embargo section from the standpoint of what policy best serves imperialism**.** Activists who want to stand with the Cuban masses must oppose the embargo as part of a stand against the exploitation of the masses by Cuban state-capitalism and the foreign corporations it welcomes in**.**

#### Coloniality naturalizes a non-ethics of death and generalizes the condition of damnation—ongoing genocide, enslavement, rape, ecological destruction and unending war is produced by and reproduces colonial epistmeologies.

Maldonado-Torres 08 [Nelson. “Against War : Views from the Underside of Modernity”¶ Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 2008. p 215-217¶ http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utexas/Doc?id=10217191&ppg=52]

Dussel, Quijano, and Wynter lead us to the understanding that what happened in the Americas was a transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war— which represented a sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian countries— into a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation, and that this epistemic and material shift occurred in the colony. Damnation, life in hell, is colonialism: a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very constitution of people and no longer solely or principally to their faith or belief. That human beings become slaves when they are vanquished in a war translates in the Americas into the suspicion that the conquered people, and then non-European peoples in general, are constitutively inferior and that therefore they should assume a position of slavery and serfdom. Later on, this idea would be solidified with respect to the slavery of African peoples, achieving stability up to the present with the tragic reality of different forms of racism. Through this process, what looked like a “state of exception” in the colonies became the rule in the modern world. However, deviating from Giorgio Agamben’s diagnosis, one must say that the colony— long before the concentration camp and the Nazi politics of extermination— served as the testing ground for the limits and possibilities of modernity, thereby revealing its darkest secrets.61 It is race, the coloniality of power, and its concomitant Eurocentrism (and¶ not only national socialisms or expressed forms of fascism) that allow the “state of exception” to continue to define ordinary relations in this, our so-called postmodern world. Race emerges within a permanent state of exception where forms of behavior that are legitimate in war become a natural part of the ordinary way of life. In that world, an otherwise extraordinary affair becomes the norm and living in it requires extraordinary effort.62 In the racial/ colonial world, the “hell” of war becomes a condition that defines the reality of racialized selves, which Fanon referred to as the damnés de la terre (condemned of the earth). The damné (condemned) is a subject who exists in a permanent “hell,” and as such, this figure serves as the main referent or liminal other that guarantees the continued affirmation of modernity as a paradigm of war. The hell of the condemned is not defined by the alienation of colonized productive forces, but rather signals the dispensability of racialized subjects, that is, the idea that the world would be fundamentally better without them. The racialized subject is ultimately a dispensable source of value, and exploitation is conceived in this context as due torture, and not solely as the extraction of surplus value. Moreover, it is this very same conception that gives rise to the particular erotic dynamics that characterize the relation between the master and its slaves or racialized workers. The condemned, in short, inhabit a context in which the confrontation with death and murder is ordinary. Their “hell” is not simply “other people,” as Sartre would have put it— at least at one point— but rather racist perceptions that are responsible for the suspension of ethical behavior toward peoples at the bottom of the color line. Through racial conceptions that became central to the modern self, modernity and coloniality produced a permanent state of war that racialized and colonized subjects cannot evade or escape. The modern function of race and the coloniality of power, I am suggesting here, can be understood as a radicalization and naturalization of the non-ethics of war in colonialism.63 This non-ethics included the practices of eliminating and enslaving certain subjects— for example, indigenous and black— as part of the enterprise of colonization. From here one could as well refer to them as the death ethics of war. War, however, is not only about killing or enslaving; it also includes a particular treatment of sexuality and femininity: rape. Coloniality is an order of things that places people of color within the murderous and rapist view of a vigilant ego, and the primary targets of this rape are women. But men of color are also seen through these lenses and feminized, to become fundamentally penetrable subjects for the ego conquiro. Racialization functions through gender and sex, and the ego conquiro is thereby constitutively a phallic ego as well.64 Dussel, who presents this thesis of the phallic character of the ego cogito, also makes links, albeit indirectly, with the reality of war. And thus, in the beginning of modernity, before Descartes discovered . . . a terrifying anthropological dualism in Europe, the Spanish conquistadors arrived in America. The phallic conception of the European-medieval world is now added to the forms of submission of the vanquished Indians. “Males,” Bartolomé de las Casas writes, are reduced through “the hardest, most horrible, and harshest serfdom”; but this only occurs with those who have remained alive, because many of them have died; however, “in war typically they only leave alive young men (mozos) and women.”65 The indigenous people who survive the massacre or are left alive have to contend with a world that considers them to be dispensable. And since their bodies have been conceived of as inherently inferior or violent, they must be constantly subdued or civilized, which requires renewed acts of conquest and colonization. The survivors continue to live in a world defined by war, and this situation is peculiar in the case of women. As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting and Renée T. White put it in the preface to their anthology Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions: A sexist and/or racist patriarchal culture and order posts and attempts to maintain, through violent acts of force if necessary, the subjugation and inferiority of women of color. As Joy James notes, “its explicit, general premise constructs a conceptual framework of male [and/or white] as normative in order to enforce a political [racial, economic, cultural, sexual] and intellectual mandate of male [and/or white] as superior.” The warfront has always been a “feminized” and “colored” space for women of color. Their experiences and perceptions of war, conflict, resistance, and struggle emerge from their specific racial-ethnic and gendered locations. “Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent,” Walzer notes. Thus, this volume operates from the premise that war has been and is presently in our midst.66 The links between war, conquest, and the exploitation of women’s bodies are hardly accidental. In his study of war and gender, Joshua Goldstein argues that conquest usually proceeds through an extension of the rape and exploitation of women in wartime.67 He argues that to understand conquest, one needs to examine: 1) male sexuality as a cause of aggression; 2) the feminization of enemies as symbolic domination; and 3) dependence on the exploitation of women’s labor— including reproduction.68 My argument is, first, that these three elements came together in a powerful way in the idea of race that began to emerge in the conquest and colonization of the Americas. My second point is that through the idea of race, these elements exceed the activity of conquest and come to define what from that point on passes as the idea of a “normal” world. As a result, the phenomenology of a racial context resembles, if it is not fundamentally identical to, the phenomenology of war and conquest. Racism posits its targets as racialized and sexualized subjects that, once vanquished, are said to be inherently servile and whose bodies come to form part of an economy of sexual abuse, exploitation, and control. The coloniality of power cannot be fully understood without reference to the transformation and naturalization of war and conquest in modern times. Hellish existence in the colonial world carries with it both the racial and the gendered aspects of the naturalization of the non-ethics of war. “Killability” and “rapeability” are inscribed into the images of colonial bodies and deeply mark their ordinary existence. Lacking real authority, colonized men are permanently feminized and simultaneously represent a constant threat for whom any amount of authority, any visible trace of the phallus is multiplied in a symbolic hysteria that knows no limits.69 Mythical depiction of the black man’s penis is a case in point: the black man is depicted as an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly white women. The black woman, in turn, is seen as always already sexually available to the rapist gaze of the white, and as fundamentally promiscuous. In short, the black woman is seen as a highly erotic being whose primary function is fulfilling sexual desire and reproduction. To be sure, any amount of “penis” in either one represents a threat, but in his most familiar and typical forms the black man represents the act of rape—“raping”—while the black woman is seen as the most legitimate victim of rape—“being raped.” In an antiblack world black women appear as subjects who deserve to be raped and to suffer the consequences— in terms of a lack of protection from the legal system, sexual abuse, and lack of financial assistance to sustain themselves and their families— just as black men deserve to be penalized for raping, even without having committed the act. Both “raping” and “being raped” are attached to blackness as if they form part of the essence of black folk, who are seen as a dispensable population. Black bodies are seen as excessively violent and erotic, as well as being the legitimate recipients of excessive violence, erotic and otherwise.70 “Killability” and “rapeability” are part of their essence, understood in a phenomenological way. The “essence” of blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part of a larger context of meaning in which the death ethics of war gradually becomes a constitutive part of an allegedly normal world. In its modern racial and colonial connotations and uses, blackness is the invention and the projection of a social body oriented by the death ethics of war.71 This murderous and raping social body projects the features that define it onto sub-Others in order to be able to legitimate the same behavior that is allegedly descriptive of them. The same ideas that inspire perverted acts in war— particularly slavery, murder, and rape— are legitimized in modernity through the idea of race and gradually come to be seen as more or less normal thanks to the alleged obviousness and non-problematic character of black slavery and anti-black racism. To be sure, those who suffer the consequences of such a system are primarily blacks and indigenous peoples, but it also deeply affects all of those who appear as colored or close to darkness. In short, this system of symbolic representations, the material conditions that in part produce and continue to legitimate it, and the existential dynamics that occur therein (which are also at the same time derivative and constitutive of such a context) are part of a process that naturalizes the non-ethics or death ethics of war. Sub-ontological difference is the result of such naturalization and is legitimized through the idea of race. In such a world, ontology collapses into a Manicheanism, as Fanon suggested.72

#### The alternative is the DEATH OF THE AMERICAN MAN – this is an epistemological and semiotic struggle to deflate the enthno-class of Man

Maldonado Torres 05 [Nelson, professor at Rutgers, “Decolonization and the New Identitarian Logics after September 11,” Radical Philosophy Review 8, n. 1 (2005): 35-67]

Inspired by these Fanonian insights l have articulated elsewhere the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.67 I think that the peculiar intricacies between "estadounidense" patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea.68 Today, after the post- 1989 and post-September 11 patriotism we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man.6 By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. American Man and its predecessor and still companion European Man are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or "America." A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what 1 aim at in my critique. "Man," here, refers to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born. ¶ It should be clear that what I call for and defend here is epistemological and semiotic struggle, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and shar­ing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity. A subversive act is that which helps us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, such as referring to "Americans" in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called "New World." Popular culture in the u\_s. has picked up on many Spanish words and phrases (such as "Ay Caramba,.. "Hasta Ia vista, baby," and several others), but "" has failed to adopt the central one (perhaps because Latin@s have not insisted on it enough): "estadounidense." "Estadounidense" is one of the most important words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It could be considered one of the most precious gifts (not an imperial but a decolonial one) from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and s e e k s to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, reception of gifts and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. Indeed, the reception or resistance of decolonizing gifts provides a measure of the presence of coloniality.¶Before being a challenge, Latin@s in this country have been colonized and ra­ cialized subjects as well as collaborators in different forms of racialization. Many Latin@s, especially conservative ones, desire the American and Americano Dream­ most often they desire it until they realize that it turns into a nightmare, both for oth­ ers and for themselves. While the culturalist-nationalist response to the Americana Dream consists in taking away the possibility of dreaming this dream in Spanish, a decolonial response rather abandons the very idea of the American or Americana Dream and offers as a gift the possibility for the Anglo-Saxon U . S . American to dream the "estadounidense" dream-a dream that does not have anything to do about speaking one language or another, but about learning from others basic ideas about how to conceive of oneself, in this case, to see oneself as a nation-in-relation rather than as a continental being.71

#### And we must decolonize debate practice itself—Education based on Western epistemologies continue forms of colonial schooling designed to reproduce coloniality- from the “moral project” of educating and civilizing the Indians to teaching of social Darwinism in the Congo. Decolonizing education requires not only an analysis of the knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, colonial history, and political economy inherent in educational activities like debate but also foregrounding the possibility of epistemic resistance.

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Revisiting histories of colonial educational policy in schooling helps us contextualize¶ and demonstrate how evidence-based education, tied to high-stakes testing and¶ neoliberalism, reproduces past colonial ideologies with respect to developing colonized¶ labor. Throughout European colonialism, schooling was not only used to colonize¶ the minds to force cultural assimilation or acceptance of colonial rule, but also to¶ produce a reservoir of subservient labor that would harvest and mine commodities for¶ the imperial economy. For instance, in North America, colonial schooling ‘introduced¶ the concept of forced labor as part of Indian education, transforming the ostensibly¶ “moral project” of civilizing Indians into a for-profit enterprise’ (Grande 2004, 13). In¶ boarding schools, part of the most important feature of the colonialist curriculum ‘was¶ the inculcation of the industrial or “Protestant” work ethic’ (13). In the Belgian¶ Congo, Darwin’s scientific racism was the dominant discourse among Belgian colonizers,¶ and it influenced their colonial educational policy. For the Belgian government¶ and leaders of industry, the Congolese was to learn in school a work ethos that clearly¶ catered to the economic endeavor, and to mold the Congolese playfulness and laziness¶ into a life of ‘progress,’ order and discipline (Seghers 2004, 465). In Hawaii, colonial¶ schools ‘became less a means of religious conversion and more a site for socializing¶ Hawaiian and immigrant children for work on the plantation’ (Kaomea 2000, 322). In¶ Africa in general, Urch notes: The demand for skilled native labor by the white settlers and commercial leaders caused¶ the colonial administrators to reevaluate the educational program of the missions.¶ Education solely for proselytization was not considered sufficient to enable the colonies’¶ economy to expand. Government officials saw the need for an educational process that¶ would help to break down tribal solidarity and force the African into a money economy.¶ (1971, 252)¶ In short, colonial schooling played a significant role in disciplining the minds and¶ bodies of the colonized for imperial profit.¶ Interestingly, when it came to ‘pillars of the curriculum,’ what was common¶ among many colonial environments, ‘were religion and the legendary “3Rs”¶ [Reading, (W)riting and “Rithmetic”]’ (Sjöström 2001, 79). These pillars of the¶ curriculum very much parallel, with a slight change, the curriculum that is tested via¶ PISA and TIMSS which concentrates on reading, math, and science. In the contemporary¶ context, science has replaced the pillar of religion in the curriculum. Also, in the¶ present context, the neoliberal economy has replaced the old imperial economy, but¶ the objective for schooling still stays the same, which is to produce a labor force for¶ the global economy. As Lipman points out, these accountability reforms ‘certify that¶ students that graduate from’ schooling ‘will have [the] basic literacies and disciplined¶ dispositions’ needed for a global workforce (2003, 340). International organizations¶ such as the OECD and the World Bank, have replaced the old adage ‘protestant work¶ ethic’ of colonial schooling, with the knowledge and skills to function in the knowledge¶ economy, such as literacy to manipulate information, problem solving, math, and¶ science (Spring 2009). In other words, like colonial schooling, education via neoliberal¶ reform is working towards reproducing a labor force and objectification of the¶ colonized. Ceasire’s argument of ‘thingification’ fits very well with the colonizing of¶ bodies in neoliberal educational reform. Teachers, students, and education in general¶ are all objectified and reduced to commodities to serve the global economy. To this¶ end, Lipman states: Students are reduced to test scores, future slots in the labor market, prison numbers, and¶ possible cannon fodder in military conquests. Teachers are reduced to technicians and¶ supervisors in the education assembly line – ‘objects’ rather than ‘subjects’ of history.¶ This system is fundamentally about the negation of human agency, despite the good¶ intentions of individuals at all levels. (2004, 179)¶ Global colonialism continues with the evidence-based education movement, as education¶ is increasingly reduced into standardized packages that can be sold in the global¶ marketplace, while at the same time promoting a system of education that is focused¶ on training a skilled workforce that will operate in the global labor market (Lipman¶ 2004; Berry 2008; Spring 2009; Rizvi and Lingard 2010). To this end, Fanon states:¶ I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things, my spirit filled¶ with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object¶ in the midst of other objects. (1967, 109).¶ The desires and agencies of many teachers, students, and educational leaders are being¶ stripped away, while at the same time they are turned into ‘an object in the midst of¶ other objects’ through the neoliberal logic of evidence-based education. In summary,¶ the neoliberal agenda, currently dominant in education systems around the world, reproduces¶ colonial educational policies. Within the evidence-based education movement, the epistemic and material are not separate but are intertwined in colonial discourse¶ and history. As this section demonstrates, evidence-based education not only colonizes¶ education epistemologically, but also perpetuates materialist power relations and¶ disciplines bodies of the colonized to serve the global economy.¶Concluding remarks and implications¶ [U]nless educational reform happens concurrently with analysis of the forces of colonialism,¶ it can only serve as a insufficient Band-aid over the incessant wound of imperialism.¶ (Grande 2004, 19)¶ Grande eloquently summarizes the intention behind this article, which is to offer a¶ conceptual map linking events of the colonial past with a present movement that¶ continues to perpetuate colonial discourses and practices within educational policy.¶ My hope is that the analysis presented in this paper provides an alteration in terms on¶ what is unsaid or left out in educational policy and bolsters a critical analysis of power¶ in educational policy. I argue in this paper that the evidence-based education movement¶ is very much tied to multiple colonial discourses, which can be traced back to a¶ colonial history that has simply been ignored in the literature. In other words, this article¶ challenges us to move beyond the confines of Eurocentrism and historical amnesia¶ to critically examine evidence-based education and to contextualize this movement¶ within colonial discourses and histories. It is my hope that this article demonstrates the usefulness of the anticolonial lens¶ in examining educational policy. This framework foregrounds the intersections¶ between knowledge, power, Eurocentrism, colonial history, and political economy, in¶ educational policy. The epistemic, cultural, and material perspectives in anticolonial¶ thought are applicable to policy analysis. This is evident in the way that ‘educational¶ research,’ ‘evidence,’ ‘curriculum,’ and ‘learning outcomes’ are being defined and¶ re-imagined in evidence-based education, as these are ultimately shaped by material¶ relations of power that are colonizing. For instance, common to any colonial¶ discourse is the rationale for purifying administration in the name of efficiency, and a¶ binaristic civilizing narrative is used in this regard. By naming and representing¶ education as a field in chaos, evidence-based education proponents, with good intentions,¶ are justifying actions and measures to make education systems more evidencebased¶ and in turn standardize and rationalize complex educational processes. As this¶ paper demonstrates, many proponents of evidence-based education profess an¶ educational policy with the intention of improving learning for all students (which¶ may be their full intent), but their discourse continues to perpetuate colonized power¶ relationships. In other words, they are unknowingly striving to control and ‘tame’¶ education through evidence-based education. An anticolonial lens also reminds us how social hierarchies and knowledge¶ systems were used to justify colonial interventions with the objective of reshaping¶ society in order to exploit the labor and material resources of the colonized, and allow¶ for certain power relations to be legitimized. In the evidence-based education movement,¶ we see the mobilization of colonial discourse with regard to the way ‘evidence’¶ and ‘learning’ is being constructed and used to purify the production of knowledge to¶ meet neoliberal ends of education. Furthermore, the anticolonial lens reveals the¶ commodification, objectification, and dehumanization of bodies and knowledge¶ systems in colonial processes. This article demonstrates how this ‘thingification’ occurs in evidence-based education for teachers, students, and educational leaders. An¶ anticolonial lens cannot separate the political economy from the epistemic issues. To¶ this end, this paper demonstrates how evidence-based education is part of a neoliberal¶ agenda which is also tied to global colonialism and the production of colonized labor.¶ In short, an anticolonial lens helps to bring forward the social–historical–political¶ processes that stem from colonial relations of power and informs contemporary¶ knowledge production, validation, and dissemination in educational policy. An anticolonial lens also stresses that colonial discourses and material relations of¶ power are not absolute, and that the colonized also have discursive and material¶ agency. To this end, one of the limitations of my analysis is that it overlooks the¶ agency among the colonized, and has presented evidence-based education as a monolithic¶ discourse with homogenizing effects, rather than a partial discourse that is¶ contested and lived differently from its intentions. Historically, and in present¶ contexts, imperialism and colonialism were never monolithic or unidirectional, and¶ the boundaries between colonizers and colonized were not clearly demarcated (see¶ Cooper and Stoler 1997; Young 2001; Bush 2006). Similarly, evidence-based education¶ is not an absolute, unidirectional discourse. From an anticolonial lens, we need to¶ look for those sites of resistance and discrepancies to highlight the limitations/¶ inequities of evidence-based education and bring those struggles to the foreground. To¶ this end, I will now discuss some examples of the ‘tensions’ and resistances to¶ evidence-based education. For instance, in Canada, the British Columbia Teacher’s¶ Federation has led a campaign to resist the Foundations Skills Assessment instituted¶ by the provincial government (http://www.bctf.ca/fsa.aspx). In Ontario, African-¶ Canadian parents are frustrated with the Toronto public schooling system failing to¶ respond to the needs of Black youth and are demanding Africentric schools from the¶ Toronto District School Board (Adjei and Agyepong 2009). In the USA, Fine et al.¶ (2007) describe, how schools, communities, parents, and grandparents are engaged in¶ active resistance to such accountability measures and schooling. Chicago residents of¶ Little Village have launched an organizing campaign for a local high school dedicated¶ to culture, community, and activism, which culminated in a 19-day hunger strike by¶ Latino high school students, educators, community organizers, residents, and even¶ grandmothers. Similarly, in a California community, largely populated by migrant¶ families, the school district, joined by nine other districts and civil rights organizations,¶ sued the state over the improper use of English-language assessments to test¶ English Language Learners and the sanctions they face under NCLB (Fine et al.¶ 2007). Teachers also have the agency to interpret, disseminate, and act on the information¶ based on such accountability policies (Lipman 2002; Ball 2003; Sloan 2007). Some¶ teachers have left the profession as an act of resistance because these accountability¶ trends no longer reflect their critical educational philosophy (McNeil 2000; Lipman¶ 2002; Ball 2003). Other teachers enact resistance by subverting the official test-based¶ curriculum. For instance, as one Chicago school teacher put it:¶ I think that we are having a rough time, that sometimes we may lean a little bit more¶ towards CPS policies and other times we lean a little bit more to ‘screw CPS’ and focus¶ on critical thinking skills. (Lipman 2002, 392)¶ Some still display ambivalence towards teaching for the test for the purpose of¶ surveillance: I have mixed feelings about it … I think it’s how we interpret the results. If we use it to¶ say our school is better than yours, then I don’t want to do it. If we use it so that we can¶ help the teachers program better for the kids, then that is more useful as a tool. (Canadian¶ Grade 3 teacher, cited in Childs and Fung 2009, 9)¶ In short, teachers, students, parents, families, and community activists have demonstrated¶ the agency to negotiate and contest these colonial discourses in every day¶ practice. Accountability reforms, tied with evidence-based education, depending on¶ context, have also had multiple effects on schools and curricula, and also have critics¶ from within. Scholars have noted how the colonizing effects of accountability reform¶ on schooling and resistance to these reforms depend on the context and the questions¶ of race, class, language, and localized policies (Lipman 2002, 2003; Earl and Fullan¶ 2003; Maxcy 2006). For instance, in her study on the impact of accountability reform¶ for four Chicago schools, Lipman notes how these ‘schools’ responses to accountability¶ are closely linked to past and present race and class advantages, the relative political¶ power of their communities, and new forms of racialization’ (2003, 338).¶ Moreover, in a significant minority of cases, high-stakes testing has led to curricular¶ content expansion, the integration of knowledge, and more student-centered, cooperative¶ pedagogies, such as in secondary social studies and language arts (Au 2007).¶ Hence, the nature of high-stakes-test-induced curricular control is highly dependent¶ on the structures of the tests themselves (Au 2007). In summary, high-stakes testing¶ does not produce a monolithic effect, but has heterogeneous results depending on¶ questions of social difference and context. Furthermore, proponents of evidence-based¶ education ‘are not monolithic and that at least some of them are open to dialog on the¶ issues on which we disagree’ (Maxwell 2004, 39). In short, an acknowledgment of the¶ colonial historical legacy of the evidence-based education movement may help us¶ move beyond a discourse of sameness in colonial discourse, and start thinking about¶ the possibilities, interruptions, contestations, and resistances to the colonizing effects¶ of evidence-based education. Recently, there has been growing ethnographic studies¶ that examine such sites of resistance and contradictions at the ground level. These¶ spaces are where future studies and dialog could focus their attention. In terms of policy and educational practice, an anticolonial lens motivates us to ask¶ a different set of questions and re-imagine educational research, practice, and policy.¶ For instance, what is being left out in the discussion of evidence-based education¶ movement is the glaring systemic inequities that are privileging some bodies¶ (students, teachers, and administrators) and knowledge systems (language, curricula,¶ and culture) over others (see McNeil 2000; Lipman 2004; Valuenzela 2005; Maxcy¶ 2006), that are tied to the global economy (Stewart-Harawira 2005). Rather than blaming¶ students, teachers, and administrators for progress in public tests, and working¶ from a deficit model, we need to shift our attention towards deploying significant¶ material and intellectual resources to serve diverse needs and minoritized bodies¶ (Lipman 2002, 2003), and challenge global economic systems. Furthermore, instead¶ of looking for the pitfalls of educational practice, we could ask and explore the following¶ questions (see Asa Hilliard cited in Lemons-Smith 2008; Hood and Hopson 2008):¶ How does academic excellence flourish in schools attended mostly by minoritized¶ students? How do teachers who reject the status quo and define excellence as responding¶ to community needs, find ways to promote excellence for all students regardless¶ of their circumstances? ‘Student achievement at what cost’ [Michael Dantley, personal communication]? What ideological paradigms underlie teacher education?¶ What is the role of teacher preparation programs in perpetuating and promoting these¶ values of equity and social justice?¶ Finally, in terms of educational policy, we may ask: whose cultural assumptions¶ and histories inform such accountability systems, ‘evidence,’ ‘data,’ and ‘learning¶ outcomes?’ ‘Whose notions of evidence matter most? And to whom does evidence¶ matter most?’ (Hood and Hopson 2008, 418). According to Stanfield (1999) and¶ Gillborn (2005), educational policy and research continue to impose the standards and¶ products of White supremacy on the racially minoritized. As Stanfield states:¶ Implicit White supremacy norms and values contribute … to Eurocentric concepts and¶ measurement epistemologies, techniques, and interpretations … Concretely, in the¶ United States and elsewhere in the West, … it has been considered normative to consider¶ Eurocentric notions and experiences as the baseline, as the yardstick to compare and¶ contrast the notions and experiences of people of color. This is … most apparent in¶ designing, implementing, and interpreting standardized tests and survey instruments.¶ (1999, 421)¶ I would argue that we need to ‘reappropriate’ evidence-based education to include a¶ broader array of evidence, experiences, and cultural knowledges (Luke 2003, 98; see¶ also Stanfield 1999; Valuenzela, Prieto, and Hamilton 2007). Finally, borrowing the¶ words of Asa Hilliard III, we need to ask, ‘do we have the will to educate all children’¶ (cited in Lemons-Smith 2008, 908), to respond to the needs, survival, self-determination,¶ and sovereignty of their respective communities and the planet? (see also Dei 2000;¶ Grande 2004). In an era of transnational capital, where ‘[g]lobalized discourses and agendasetting¶ and policy pressures now emerge from beyond the nation’(Rizvi and Lingard¶ 2010, 14–15), we need to have transnational dialogs (Mohanty 2003) on the impact of¶ evidence-based education and neoliberal reform across borders and social institutions.¶ This is because such transnational alliances and solidarity are needed to contest global¶ forces informed by transnational corporations as well as international organizations¶ such as the World Bank and OECD. What is noteworthy and rarely discussed, are the¶ similarities and differences in the discourses and effects of evidence-based education¶ movement across the three nation-states analyzed in this paper. Future research could¶ speculate and study how these ideas of evidence-based education circulate and move¶ across borders (see Rizvi and Lingard 2010).¶ Finally, as someone who has had the privilege to teach research methodology to¶ graduate students (including teachers, teacher educators, principals, and superintendents),¶ I am alarmed by how many of my students grumble about standardized testing,¶ and some even focus their research on such topics. What is also disconcerting is how¶ many of my students have a hard time imagining research and evidence that go¶ beyond numbers because of the ‘numbers game’ they must play in their daily working¶ lives. These trends are not a reflection of my students’ inabilities to see beyond¶ numbers, but a testament to the hegemony of the structural environment that reminds¶ them of what constitutes valid knowledge every day. Also of great concern is the¶ speed at which educational leaders, students, and teachers are being rushed through¶ standardized processes that leave little time for reflection, authenticity, and healing.¶ Many of my students have shared these accounts in my classroom, with me in person,¶ and in their reflection papers. For instance, one student who is currently a high school¶ teacher commented in a recent email: ‘The standards and objectives themselves work to eliminate any third space or anticolonial space. We read, write, process for the sole¶ purpose of testing and not for liberation.’¶ In this regard, I propose that we need to ‘slow down’ in educational practice and¶ policy. To this end, I am reminded of the words of Malidoma Some, an African Shaman¶ healer, who stated ‘while that the indigenous world looks, the industrial world over¶ looks’ (emphasis added). Educators, teachers, students, and policy-makers need time,¶ not to be given more information for decision-making or learning, but more importantly¶ to assess what we are overlooking in educating future generations. For instance, we¶ need more time to come together, dialog, heal, build reciprocity, understand difference,¶ and re-imagine educational policy and practice for the benefit of future generations. It¶ is only by slowing down that we will realize that our students, educational researchers,¶ teachers, and administrators are not ‘uncultivated soil,’ in the words of La Casas, but¶ rather seeds with the power within to germinate on their own if they are provided the¶ freedom, resources, and time. Slowing down is what I believe decolonizing education¶ means in this era of neoliberal policies and transnational capital!

## Solvency

#### Uncertainty and nonlinearity are inevitable due to inherent complexity within systems

**Ramalingam et al 8** [Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity: Ideas and Implications for development and humanitarian efforts" <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/833.pdf> ] 10

Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ‘... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems’ (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of ‘laws’ of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science, using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that human systems do not work in a simple linear fashion. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems, clear causal relations cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction between linear and nonlinearity is far from trivial. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985): there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals. Linearity describes the proportionality assumed in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece analysed separately; finally, all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right answer to the original problem. In a linear system, the whole is exactly equivalent to the sum of the parts. However, linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality – most systems only behave linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard. When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, ‘all bets are off’ (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear – the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the ‘hard’ science paradigms and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms. Nonlinearity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such relationships cannot be taken apart – they have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity. However, the need to develop such ways of thinking cannot be overstated – as one thinker puts it: ‘... every major unresolved problem in science – from consciousness to cancer to the collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear’ (Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events – one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a ‘qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative’ when attempting to investigate them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable – referred to as the independent variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement ‘holding all other things constant’. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties, this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at ‘just one thing’, or to make only one change, hence to look at a situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account – more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear one: ‘Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] … in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is assembled’ (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or B’s Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodríguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of ‘radical uncertainty’ about any generalised growth models. They call their method ‘growth diagnostics’, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the country’s concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the dynamics of change are highly context-specific. Therefore, if there are assumptions, aggregations and theories about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are not entirely appropriate when applied to the dynamics of a new local situation, then this perspective is unlikely to lead to a deep understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the hoped-for changes. Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. ‘No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial’ (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation one’s perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system, one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003). It is important **from the outset** to understand the association and interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one causes another to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very

linear logic, which suggests that if Activity A is done, Output B will result, leading to Outcome C and Impact D. This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: ‘Unfortunately (for the logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work. Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be one-dimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors’ (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear. The distinction between linearity and nonlinearity can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to re-frame the debate. If the two goals of accountability and learning are also about different mindsets, the degree to which an appropriate balance can be struck – without exploring these mindsets and the assumptions on which they are based – is open to question. Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships – where changes are not proportional, small changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below. The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions – ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part\_1\_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at a given time. At any time, the system’s state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: ‘… however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that long-range prediction becomes impossible … even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction’ (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to initial conditions also means that ‘the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile’ (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of ‘good practice’ requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the success of a nation may be best explained not by its population’s virtues, its natural resources and its government’s skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of ‘path dependence’, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a system’s development, but once one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes ‘locked in’ and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, ‘… many cities developed where and how they did not because of the “natural advantages” we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours’ (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term ‘path dependence’ is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched ’lock ins’ - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century, which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative end-states, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998).  Example: Sensitive dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process – that is, what eventually happens to an economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995). In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure of production; the degree of the economy’s openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about to become the ‘new tiger’ of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: ‘… the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively’ (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To quote directly, ‘… perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference’ (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna goes on: ‘For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus.’ With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the transferability of ‘best practice’, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search for ‘best practices’ may need to be replaced by the search for ‘good principles’. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for ‘… development workers to become facilitators … enabling representatives of other communities … to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate’ (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind is impossible may be overstating the case. Complexity does suggest that, in certain kinds of systems, future events cannot be forecasted to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales. However, in other systems, future events can be foreseen in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it is important to identify and analyse these levels of unpredictability as part of the nature of the systems with which we work, and not treat uncertainty as in some way ‘unscientific’ or embarrassing. Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to rethink the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an acceptance of the inherent levels of uncertainty into planning. The requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving one’s models of change and analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have ‘fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes’ (Westley et al., 2006).

## Cred

#### Credibility not key—their ev’s stuck in the Cold War

Stephen M. Walt 12, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "Why are U.S. leaders so obsessed with credibility?" September 11, Foreign Policy, walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/11/the\_credibility\_fetish

What's the biggest mistake the United States has made since the end of the Cold War? Invading Iraq? Helping screw up the Israel-Palestine peace process? Missing the warning signs for 9/11, and then overreacting to the actual level of danger that Al Qaeda really posed? Not recognizing we had a bubble economy and a corrupt financial industry until after the 2007 meltdown?¶ Those are all worthy candidates, and I'm sure readers can think of others. But today I want to propose another persistent error, which lies at the heart of many of the missed opportunities or sins of commission that we made since the Berlin Wall came down. It is in essence a conceptual mistake: a failure to realize just how much the world changed when the Soviet Union collapsed, and a concomitant failure to adjust our basic approach to foreign policy appropriately.¶ I call this error the "credibility fetish." U.S. leaders have continued to believe that our security depends on convincing both allies and adversaries that we are steadfast, loyal, reliable, etc., and that our security guarantees are iron-clad. It is a formula that reinforces diplomatic rigidity, because it requires us to keep doing things to keep allies happy and issuing threats (or in some cases, taking actions) to convince foes that we are serious. And while it might have made some degree of sense during the Cold War, it is increasingly counterproductive today.¶ One could argue that credibility did matter during the Cold War. The United States did face a serious peer competitor in those days, and the Soviet Union did have impressive military capabilities. Although a direct Soviet attack on vital U.S. interests was always unlikely, one could at least imagine certain events that might have shifted the global balance of power dramatically. For example, had the Soviet Union been able to conquer Western Europe or the Persian Gulf and incorporate these assets into its larger empire, it would have had serious consequences for the United States. Accordingly, U.S. leaders worked hard to make sure that the U.S. commitment to NATO was credible, and we did similar things to bolster U.S. credibility in Asia and the Gulf.¶ Of course, we probably overstated the importance of "credibility" even then. Sloppy analogies like the infamous "domino theory" helped convince Americans that we had to fight in places that didn't matter (e.g., Vietnam) in order to convince everyone that we'd also be willing to fight in places that did. We also managed to convince ourselves that credible nuclear deterrence depended on having a mythical ability to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear exchange, even though winning would have had little meaning once a few dozen missiles had been fired.¶ Nonetheless, in the rigid, bipolar context of the Cold War, it made sense for the United States to pay some attention to its credibility as an alliance leader and security provider. But today, the United States faces no peer competitor, and it is hard to think of any single event that would provoke a rapid and decisive shift in the global balance of power. Instead of a clear geopolitical rival, we face a group of medium powers: some of them friendly (Germany, the UK, Japan, etc.) and some of them partly antagonistic (Russia, China). Yet Russia is economically linked to our NATO allies, and China is a major U.S. trading partner and has been a major financier of U.S. debt. This not your parents' Cold War. There are also influential regional powers such as Turkey, India, or Brazil, with whom the U.S. relationship is mixed: We agree on some issues and are at odds on others. And then there are clients who depend on U.S. protection (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Taiwan, etc.) but whose behavior often creates serious headaches for whoever is in the White House.¶ As distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman recently commented, "the complexity and dynamism of the new order place a premium on diplomatic agility. Stolid constancy and loyalty to pre-existing alliance relationship are not the self-evident virtues they once were. We should not be surprised that erstwhile allies put their own interest ahead of ours and act accordingly. Where it is to our long-term advantage, we should do the same."¶ What might this mean in practice? As I've noted repeatedly, it means beginning by recognizing that the United States is both very powerful and very secure, and that there's hardly anything that could happen in the international system that would alter the global balance of power overnight. The balance is shifting, to be sure, but these adjustments will take place over the course of decades. Weaker states who would like U.S. protection need it a lot more than we need them, which means our "credibility" is more their problem than ours. Which in turn means that if other states want our help, they should be willing to do a lot to convince us to provide it.¶ Instead of obsessing about our own "credibility," in short, and bending over backwards to convince the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Afghans, Israelis, Saudis, and others that we will do whatever it takes to protect them, we ought to be asking them what they are going to do for themselves, and also for us. And instead of spending all our time trying to scare the bejeezus out of countries like Iran (which merely reinforces their interest in getting some sort of deterrent), we ought to be reminding them over and over that we have a lot to offer and are open to better relations, even if the clerical regime remains in power and maybe even if -- horrors! -- it retains possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle (under IAEA safeguards). If nothing else, adopting a less confrontational posture is bound to complicate their own calculations.¶ This is not an argument for Bush-style unilateralism, or for a retreat to Fortress America. Rather, it is a call for greater imagination and flexibility in how we deal with friends and foes alike. I'm not saying that we should strive for zero credibility, of course; I'm merely saying that we'd be better off if other states understood that our credibility was more conditional. In other words, allies need to be reminded that our help is conditional on their compliance with our interests (at least to some degree) and adversaries should also be reminded that our opposition is equally conditional on what they do. In both cases we also need to recognize that we are rarely going to get other states to do everything we want. Above all, it is a call to recognize that our geopolitical position, military power, and underlying economic strength give us the luxury of being agile in precisely the way that Freeman depicts.¶ Of course, some present U.S. allies would be alarmed by the course I'm suggesting, because it would affect the sweetheart deals they've been enjoying for years. They'll tell us they are losing confidence in our leadership, and they'll threaten to go neutral, or maybe even align with our adversaries. Where possible, they will enlist Americans who are sympathetic to their plight to pressure on U.S. politicians to offer new assurances. In most cases, however, such threats don't need to be taken seriously. And we just have to patiently explain to them that we're not necessarily abandoning them, we are merely 1) making our support more conditional on their cooperation with us on things we care about, and 2) remaining open to improving relations with other countries, including some countries that some of our current allies might have doubts about. I know: It's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world define it for us.¶ The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do. And even when allies are of considerable value to us, we still have the most leverage in nearly every case. As soon as we start obsessing about our credibility, however, we hand that leverage back to our weaker partners and we constrain our ability to pursue meaningful diplomatic solutions to existing conflicts. Fetishizing credibility, in short, is one of the reasons American diplomacy has achieved relatively little since the end of the Cold War.

#### No impact—Even if the US declines, liberal international norms will survive

Ikenberry 11 – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### Heg fails – we cant assert our influence effectively

**Maher** 11-12-**2010** (Richard is a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University. “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World” Science Direct)

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes.¶ As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics.¶ As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

#### 3. Their authors have it backwards – countries will take advantage of U.S. security guarantees to provoke war

Eland, 02 (Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ivan, “The Empire Strikes Out The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws", Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)

Of course, one way to try to enhance American credibility would be to deploy increasingly large numbers of U.S. forces on foreign soil and ships in foreign ports. But such forward engagement is practical only when small, dispersed forces can efficiently dominate a vast geographical area. In addition, the trend has been in the opposite direction— the United States has reduced its overseas military presence and foreign bases— making the extended deterrence strategy ring hollow. The U.S. military (particularly the Navy), by choosing to purchase expensive armaments in ever smaller quantities, reduces the number of places the dwindling (but more powerful) U.S. forces can be at once. The extended deterrence strategy also will not be credible because the United States does not really put the same value on all parts of the world. As a result, a policy of extended deterrence could actually invite challenges from rival states wanting to expose the underlying unreality of the posture. In such a case, Washington would be forced to choose between a humiliating climb-down or a conflict over a strategically irrelevant piece of real estate. The strategy of empire could prove counterproductive in other ways as well. For starters, Washington’s self-assumed responsibility to keep order could be exploited by all sorts of states wanting to advance their own goals. Taiwan could declare its independence with the expectation that the United States would protect it from China’s reaction; Pakistan could exploit its new strategic importance by successfully challenging India on Kashmir; rebel groups everywhere could intentionally provoke crackdowns—like the Kosovo Liberation Army did in southern Serbia in 1999—with the presumption that the United States would step in and internationalize their cause; and Arab countries, knowing that the Bush administration needs their support for any invasion of Iraq, are withholding it, unless the United States can show progress in its efforts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

## AG

#### 1. Empirically denied – food prices have been spiraling upwards for months

#### 2. Food price rise inevitable – multiple reasons

Strain, 08 (Jeffery, staff writer, The Street, 7-7-08, http://www.mainstreet.com/eight-reasons-food-prices-will-keep-rising?puc=msgoogle&cm\_ven=MSGoogle)

Be prepared -- food is going to become more expensive, even if oil prices stabilize. Agriculture tends to be heavily dependent on energy for fueling tractors and field equipment, as well as having a heavy reliance on petroleum-based fertilizers and herbicides. But what most people don't realize is thateven if oil prices level off, food prices are likely to continue to rise**.** Here are some reasons food prices will continue to increase**.** BeesThe number of bees has been dramatically declining over the last few years.In 2006, Colony Collapse Disorder wiped out 30% to 90% of beekeeper hives. The losses continued last year through this yearwith over 30% of hives being destroyed in both 2007 and 2008.The exact cause of Colony Collapse Disorder is not known**.** Since roughly 75% of flowering plants rely on pollination to help them reproduce, bees are an important link in the chain that produces much of the food that we eat. Without bees to pollinate crops, the crops can't bear fruit, causing crop yields to drop. The end result is higher prices in the supermarket for these foods. HoardingA growing number of countries have sharply curbed food exports in order to ensure an adequate supply of food at affordable prices for their country. While this trend is a much bigger problem for poor countries that rely heavily on imported food than the U.S., it also puts pressure on world food prices including those foods being imported to the U.S. To make matters worse, the hoarding creates the perception of food shortages, which can lead to more hoarding and further increases food prices. World Demand for FoodThere is a growing demand for food around the world with the emergence of a middle class in such places as China, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East**.** With more disposable income, these people demand more and a greater variety of food. These middle classes will likely continue to increase, placing more pressure on world food prices. The Lowly DollarThe dollar has fallen against other world currenciesover the past year.When the dollar goes downin value against other currencies,any dollar-denominated [commodity](http://www.mainstreet.com/eight-reasons-food-prices-will-keep-rising?puc=msgoogle&cm_ven=MSGoogle) tends to go up in price. Part of the huge increase in oil prices can be attributed to the fall of the value of the dollar against other currencies. In the same way, most majorfood [commodities](http://www.mainstreet.com/eight-reasons-food-prices-will-keep-rising?puc=msgoogle&cm_ven=MSGoogle) are traded in dollars**,** which makes foreign-produced food more expensive. Hidden Price Increases Normally, food manufacturers would be hard-pressed to increase food prices further if they had already raised prices with their increased costs from oil. There is always fear among food manufacturers when they must raise prices that doing so will cause a decline in the amount they can sell. One way around this that manufacturers have been using is that instead of raising the price marked on the product, they simply place less into the package. Many people don't notice the change so they don't lose as much in sales. Having done this, food manufacturers still have room to raise the actual prices where they would have been much more reluctant to do so if they had previously raised prices the same way. Weather Recent flooding in the Midwest and Corn Belt has prevented farmers from planting soybeans and damaged the corn crop, which had recently been planted**.** Analysts have estimated that there may be a shortfall of 15% or more in grain produced this yearcompared to last year due to the flooding**.** The bad weather hasn't been limited to the U.S. Poor weather has reduced overall global food production from Canada, the European Union and Eastern Europe over the last couple of years. A drought has resulted in a major Australian wheat decline.This has tightened world food [stocks](http://www.mainstreet.com/eight-reasons-food-prices-will-keep-rising?puc=msgoogle&cm_ven=MSGoogle), which has contributed to rising food prices**.** SpeculationSpeculation's role in increased food prices is hotly debated, but it appears that investors have taken an interest in food prices and are playing a larger role in the commodity markets.As food supplies tighten, there is a good chance that speculators will increase in the hope of making a quick buck, further increasing food prices.

#### 3. Multiple alternate causes to food prices

Teslik, 08 – Assistant Editor at Council on Foreign Relations (Lee Hudson, “Food Prices”, 6/30/2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16662/food\_prices.html)

Before considering factors like supply and demand within food markets, it is important to understand the umbrella factors influencing costs of production and, even more broadly, the currencies with which and economies within which food is traded. Energy Prices. Rising energy prices have direct causal implications for the food market. Fuel is used in several aspects of the agricultural production process, including fertilization, processing, and transportation. The percentage of total agricultural input expenditures directed toward energy costs has risen significantly in recent years. A briefing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that the U.S. agricultural industry’s total expenditures on fuel and oil are forecast to rise 12.6 percent in 2008, following a rise of 11.5 percent in 2007. ¶ These costs are typically passed along to customers and are reflected in global spot prices (i.e. the current price a commodity trades for at market). The input costs of electricity have also risen, furthering the burden. Though it isn’t itself an energy product, fertilizer is an energy-intensive expense, particularly when substantial transport costs are borne by local farmers—so that expense, too, is reflected in the final price of foodstuffs. (Beyond direct causation, energy prices are also correlated to food prices, in the sense that many of the same factors pushing up energy prices—population trends, for instance, or market speculation—also affect food prices.) Currencies/Inflation. When food is traded internationally—particularly on commodities exchanges or futures markets—it is often denominated in U.S. dollars. In recent years, the valuation of the dollar has fallen with respect to many other major world currencies. This means that even if food prices stayed steady with respect to a basket of currencies, their price in dollars would have risen. Of course, food prices have not stayed steady—they have risen across the board—but if you examine international food prices in dollar terms, it is worth noting that the decline of the dollar accentuates any apparent price increase. Demand Demand for most kinds of food has risen in the past decade. This trend can be attributed to several factors: Population trends. The world’s population has grown a little more than 12 percent in the past decade. Virtually nobody argues that this trend alone accounts for rising food prices—agricultural production has, in many cases, become more efficient, offsetting the needs of a larger population—and some analysts say population growth hasn’t had any impact whatsoever on food prices. The shortcomings of a Malthusian food-price argument are most obvious in the very recent past. Richard Posner, a professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago, argues this point on his blog. He notes that in 2007 the food price index used by the FAO rose 40 percent, as compared to 9 percent in 2006—clearly a much faster rate than global population growth for that year, which measured a little over 1 percent. Nonetheless, experts say population trends, distinct from sheer growth rates, have had a major impact on food prices. For instance, the past decade has seen the rapid growth of a global middle class. This, Posner says, has led to changing tastes, and increasing demand for food that is less efficient to produce. Specifically, he cites an increased demand for meats. Livestock require farmland for grazing (land that could be used to grow other food), and also compete directly with humans for food resources like maize. The production of one serving of meat, economists say, is vastly less efficient than the production of one serving of corn or rice. Biofuels. Experts say government policies that provide incentives for farmers to use crops to produce energy, rather than food, have exacerbated food shortages. Specifically, many economists fault U.S. policies diverting maize crops to the production of ethanol and other biofuels. The effects of ramped-up U.S. ethanol production—which President Bush called for as part of an initiative to make the United States “energy independent”—was highlighted in a 2007 Foreign Affairs article by C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer. Runge and Senauer write that the push to increase ethanol production has spawned ethanol subsidies in many countries, not just the United States. Brazil, they note, produced 45.2 percent of the world’s ethanol in 2005 (from sugar cane), and the United States 44.5 percent (from corn). Europe also produces biodiesel, mostly from oilseeds. In all cases, the result is the diversion of food products from global food markets, accentuating demand, pinching supply, and pushing up prices. Joachim von Braun, the director general of IFPRI, writes in an April 2008 briefing (PDF) that 30 percent of all maize produced in the United States (by far the largest maize producer in the world) will be diverted to biofuel production in 2008. This raises prices not only for people buying maize directly, but also for those buying maize products (cornflakes) or meat from livestock that feed on maize (cattle). Speculation. Many analysts point to speculative trading practices as a factor influencing rising food prices. In May 2008 testimony (PDF) before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security, Michael W. Masters, the managing partner of the hedge fund Masters Capital Management, explained the dynamic. Masters says institutional investors like hedge funds and pension funds started pouring money into commodities futures markets in the early 2000s, pushing up futures contracts and, in turn, spot prices. Spot traders often use futures markets as a benchmark for what price they are willing to pay, so even if futures contracts are inflated by an external factor like a flood of interest from pension funds, this still tends to result in a bump for spot prices. Still, much debate remains about the extent to which speculation in futures markets in fact pushes up food prices. “In general we [economists] think futures markets are a good reflection of what’s likely to happen in the real future,” says IFPRI’s Orden. Orden acknowledges that more capital has flowed into agricultural commodities markets in recent years, but says that he “tends to think these markets are pretty efficient and that you shouldn’t look for a scapegoat in speculators.” Supply Even as demand for agricultural products has risen, several factors have pinched global supply. These include: Development/urbanization. During the past half decade, global economic growth has featured expansion throughout emerging markets, even as developed economies in the United States, Europe, and Japan have cooled. The economies of China, India, Russia, numerous countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and a handful of achievers in the Middle East and Africa have experienced strong economic growth rates. This is particularly true in Asian cities, where industrial and service sector development has clustered. The result has often been a boost for per capita earnings but a drag on domestic agriculture, as discussed in this backgrounder on African agriculture. Farmland has in many cases been repurposed for urban or industrial development projects. Governments have not, typically, been as eager to invest in modernizing farm equipment or irrigation techniques as they have been to sink money into urban development. All this has put an increased burden on developing-world farmers, precisely as they dwindle in number and supply capacity. Production capacity in other parts of the world has increased by leaps and bounds as efficiency has increased, and, as previously noted, total global production exceeds global demand. But urbanization opens markets up to other factors—transportation costs and risks, for instance, which are particularly high in less accessible parts of the developing world—and prevent the smooth functioning of trade, even where there are willing buyers and sellers. Weather. Some of the factors leading to recent price increases have been weather-related factors that tightened supply in specific markets. ¶ In 2008, for instance, two major weather events worked in concert to squeeze Asian rice production—Cyclone Nargis, which led to massive flooding and the destruction of rice harvests in Myanmar; and a major drought in parts of Australia. Estimates indicate Myanmar’s flooding instantly destroyed a substantial portion of Myanmar’s harvest, limiting the country’s ability to export rice. Meanwhile, Australia’s drought wiped out 98 percent of the country’s rice harvest in 2008, forcing Canberra to turn to imports and further straining Asia’s rice market. Trade policy. Agricultural trade barriers have long been faulted for gumming up trade negotiations, including the Doha round of World Trade Organization talks. But in the midst of the recent food pinch, a different kind of trade barrier has emerged as a problem—export bans. As discussed before (in the instance of the Philippines meeting difficulty in its efforts to import rice), several exporters have tightened the reins in light of domestic supply concerns. According to the UN’s World Food Program, over forty countries have imposed some form of export ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. India, for instance, imposed bans on exporting some forms of rice and oil in June 2008—a move that took food off the market, led to stockpiling, and brought a spike in prices. China, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, among other countries, have introduced similar bans. The distorting effects of these barriers are particularly troubling in the developing world, where a much larger percentage of average household income is spent on food. The African Development Bank warned in May 2008 that similar moves among African countries could rapidly exacerbate food concerns on the African continent. A group of West African countries, meanwhile, sought to mitigate the negative effects of export bans by exempting one another. Food aid policy and other policies. Experts say flaws in food aid policies have limited its effectiveness and in some cases exacerbated price pressures on food. CFR Senior Fellow Laurie Garrett discusses some of these factors in a recent working paper. Garrett cites illogical aid policies such as grants for irrigation and mechanization of crop production that the Asian Development Bank plans to give to Bangladesh, a densely populated country without “a spare millimeter of arable land.” Garrett also criticizes food aid policies (U.S. aid policies are one example) that mandate food aid to be doled out in the form of crops grown by U.S. farmers, rather than cash. The rub, she says, is that food grown in the United States is far more expensive, both to produce and to transport, than food grown in recipient countries. Such a policy guarantees that the dollar value of donations goes much less far than it would if aid were directed to funds that could be spent in local markets. Other experts note additional policies that limit supply. In a recent interview with CFR.org, Paul Collier, an economics professor at Oxford University, cites European bans on genetically modified crops as a prime example.

#### 1. Kost concludes neg – model can’t spillover

**Kost 04** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?”

UNLIKELY ROLE MODEL¶ Cuba has developed an alternative organic-oriented¶ agricultural production and distribution system.¶ That system was developed to respond to a crisis¶ brought about by a set of unique circumstances, but¶ may not be viable in the longer run. Only with sufficient economic, social, and political incentives will¶ Cuba’s system evolve into anything like a sustainable¶ organic-oriented approach to food production.¶ The conditions Cuba faced—dire straits, a lack of alternatives, and a command economy to create this¶ system of near-organic and urban agriculture—are¶ unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Resource constraints and relative prices in most other economies¶ will not favor a profitable, similar production system.¶ Still, other countries faced with resource constraints¶ and food shortages should look to underutilized¶ resources—particularly surplus labor—and consider unconventional production techniques to make¶ those resources productive. Locally grown fruit and¶ vegetables can significantly augment a country’s¶ commercial production and imports, but will not,¶ however, provide long-run food and agriculture solutions.

#### 2. Multiple alt causes – your author

**Kost 04** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?”

Seed & land shortages, soil quality, pollution, litter, water storage, infrastructure, energy In spite of successes, Cuba’s urban agriculture program faces several problems that limit further expansion. Seed shortages continue. Land remains in short¶ supply. Soil quality of available land is low. Many¶ years of spilled pollutants have contaminated much¶ of the available urban land. Significant portions of¶ land are covered with litter. The major problem, and¶ the hardest to address, continues to be a fresh water¶ shortage. This shortage is further compounded by¶ Cuba’s dilapidated infrastructure, which constrains¶ movement of available water, and the lack of energy¶ needed to power pumps.

#### 4. Turn – Cuban economic growth makes them import food – means they abandon the model

**Kost 04** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, “CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?”

Is the market price premium high enough to create¶ incentives for Cuban producers to continue supplying organic products? As the country’s economy continues to growth, the labor supply available to organic farming will both shrink and become more costly.¶ Bolstered by higher incomes and the increased availability of foreign exchange, Cuba will likely resume¶ imports of agricultural inputs and commercial input¶ prices will decline. If fuel, chemical fertilizer and pesticides again become readily available and relatively¶ cheap, will farmers again start using them to increase¶ production?¶ Higher incomes and increased availability of foreign¶ exchange will also make it easier for Cuba to import¶ food products. Cheaper food imports could reduce¶ the demand for domestically produced food. The resulting lower prices could weaken incentives to expand domestic production, particularly if production¶ costs remain high. Cheap food imports would then¶ reduce incentives to continue domestic organic food¶ production.

#### 5. Kost doesn’t say their model will spread, it says that they will export to the rest of the world

#### Species extinction won't cause human extinction – humans and the environment are adaptable

Doremus, 00 (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.